

Memo

To: Nancy Chang

From: John Whaley and Nick Adams, American Environics

Date: March 16, 2009

Re: Survey Results

I. Summary of key findings

1. While most Americans strongly defend civil liberties in the abstract, they quickly and readily abandon many of them when they believe those civil liberties undermine national security needs.
2. Defining the terrorist threat as serious, but nonetheless decentralized, disorganized, and primarily concerned with local and national level disputes — in terms largely consistent with independent expert views — reduces the salience of the terrorist threat.
3. Respondents exposed to the decentralized salience prime are significantly less likely to support specific extralegal security measures described in the scenarios (e.g., racial profiling, detention, and warrantless wiretapping).
4. When it comes to wiretapping and racial profiling, morality-based arguments (e.g., these methods violate the Constitution, are contrary to American values, etc.) appear to be counterproductive.
5. When it comes to detention and torture, it appears that moral and effectiveness arguments play an interactive role in undermining support for these methods.

6. The base and anti-base segments are highly driven both ideologically and psychologically, and their support or opposition to the various extralegal methods is far less dependent on arguments about morality or effectiveness. Nevertheless, morality-based arguments assist in firming up opposition among the base.
7. Town Square Faithfuls, who appear to be very “morally anchored” respond more strongly to moral arguments in cases where the extralegal method inflicts pain and suffering, but are otherwise partial to effectiveness-based arguments.
8. Reluctant Fearfuls are especially susceptible to effectiveness arguments, particularly in an environment of increased threat salience.

III. Methodology

A two-by-two split survey of 2,000 Americans was conducted to test “high vs. low threat” frames and “effectiveness vs. morality” frames. This methodology was developed by Dr. Robb Willer and his graduate student, Nick Adams, now with American Enviro-nics, in their research on the partisanship effect of making the terrorist threat more salient.

In this two-by-two design, survey respondents were randomly assigned to one of four samples. In each sample, respondents were exposed to a distinct frame about the salience of terrorist threat and either morality-based or effectiveness-based reasons to oppose extralegal counterterrorism methods. Within the salience frame, respondents read a hypothetical Associated Press article in which terrorists were either described as highly organized conspiracy bent on the destruction of the west, or as a loosely connected network of criminals primarily focused on their own local agendas.

In the second split, respondents read four hypothetical scenarios in which officials used extralegal methods to counter a specific terrorist threat. The four methods described—wiretapping, profiling, detention, and torture—are shown below:

Wiretapping:

Suppose a U.S. citizen is talking on the telephone and uses the words “terrorism,” “bomb,” and “airport.” Computers at the CIA hear these words and alert officials there. Without getting a warrant, they begin recording all calls made or received by this citizen, even though they don’t know whether the citizen is a true threat or just expressing concerns about flying.

Profiling:

Suppose that airport security officials conduct a more thorough search on a male passenger who appears to be of Middle Eastern descent. They pull him out of the line and take him to a separate room where they pat him down and go through his clothing and belongings.

Detention:

Suppose that U.S. military forces in Afghanistan capture hundreds of men who they suspect to have terrorist connections. They send these men to a high security facility thousands of miles away where they are held indefinitely, denied access to lawyers and never told the evidence against them. In many cases, their families have no knowledge of where they are.

Torture:

Suppose that FBI agents are interrogating a high-level terrorist suspect who they believe knows about planned attacks on Americans. He is refusing to cooperate. In order to get him to talk, interrogators subject the suspect to high voltage electric shocks.

After reviewing the scenarios, respondents were exposed to arguments supporting or opposing those methods. The support arguments mirrored those made by Bush Administration officials and others following typical post-9/11 language. The sample split occurred in the opposition arguments, in which respondents either read arguments framed in immoral/illegal terms, or they read statements that argued these methods were ineffective.


The table below summarizes how the samples were split:

		Opposition frame to extralegal counterterrorism methods	
		<i>C. Immoral/illegal</i>	<i>D. Ineffective</i>
Salience of terrorist threat	<i>A. High salience</i>	SAMPLE A/C	SAMPLE A/D
	<i>B. Low salience</i>	SAMPLE B/C	SAMPLE B/D

Careful attention was paid in an effort to “set” the priming frames as deeply as possible for each survey respondent. For example, respondents were exposed to each frame multiple times, even to the point of having respondents answer comprehension questions about what they had just read. We also conducted the survey online, to ensure that respondents more intensely focused on the content than they might if they were taking the survey by telephone (where it’s not uncommon for respondents to multitask (e.g., make dinner) while answering questions). The online format also served to reduce the chances for “social desirability bias”—i.e., the problem of respondents providing answers that they believe a telephone interviewer wants to hear. Social desirability bias is especially problematic when asking respondents about sensitive topics such as torture.

The questionnaire also included a battery of questions that allowed us to segment the data into the eight values-based segments that constitute the national security and human rights Roadmap. The values map below highlights the differentiated nature of these segments—

which we label “COO” for “Constituents of Opportunity.” Each COO occupies a distinct space on the map, with each of the four map quadrants containing two COOs.



The table below shows the relative size of each COO in the general population, as well as their names and whether they represent a base constituency (i.e., generally supportive of NSHR efforts), an anti-base (i.e., unsupportive), or swing segment. More detailed descriptions of these COO’s are available in an earlier memo, attached as Appendix A.

COO 1	COO 2	COO 3	COO 4	COO 5	COO 6	COO 7	COO 8
Town Square Faithfuls	Engaged Egalitarians	Reluctant Fearfuls	Zero-sum Individual -ists	Uninhibited Materialists	Boundless Anti-authoritarians	Unrestrained Fatalists	Detached Patriots
Swing	Base	Swing	Swing	Swing	Base	Swing	Anti-Base
27%	16%	15%	13%	9%	9%	6%	5%

The subsequent survey analysis focuses primarily on four COOs: The base segment (COO2—Engaged Egalitarians); the two swing key segments with whom we conducted focus groups (COO1—Town Square Faithfuls and COO3—Reluctant Fearfuls); and the anti-base (COO8—Detached Patriots).

IV. Research Findings

1. **While most Americans strongly defend civil liberties in the abstract, they quickly and readily abandon many of them when they believe they contradict national security needs.**

This finding is broadly consistent with fifty years of scholarly, empirical research that shows most people will sacrifice at least some of their rights — and even more of other people’s rights — when they feel their security is threatened.

In our survey, 92% percent of Americans agree with the following abstract statement:

"Even as we battle threats to our security, our country must act in ways that are consistent with American values and American morality."

This finding would suggest that only about 8% of Americans support extralegal counterterrorism methods. As it turns out, however, this estimate significantly underestimates support for these methods when respondents are forced to consider real-life scenarios about specific terrorist threat. As the table below shows, approximately 40% of respondents say they support the extralegal counterterrorism methods described in each scenario:

	Overall Support for Extralegal Methods Described in Scenario			
	A/C: Centralized Threat/Immoral	A/D: Centralized Threat/Ineffective	B/C: Decentralized Threat/Immoral	B/D: Decentralized Threat/Ineffective
	%	%	%	%
Wiretapping	46	43	44	37
Profiling	47	46	44	40
Detention	37	43	37	42
Torture	37	42	41	40

These results should warn us against paying too close attention to abstract polling questions. Almost all Americans will side with our basic American principles when that only requires agreeing with a survey item. But when they are presented with more difficult and concrete situations that they actually have to think through, they think quite differently.

2. Defining the terrorist threat as serious but nonetheless decentralized, disorganized, and primarily concerned with local and national level disputes — in terms largely consistent with independent expert views — reduces the salience of the terrorist threat.

As noted above, the sample respondents were initially split into two groups to test the priming effects of two distinct salience frames. One group of respondents read a hypothetical AP article describing terrorism as highly centralized and intent on attacking the U.S. (centralized threat salience), while another group read a similarly hypothetical AP article in which terrorists were less centralized and more focused on local objectives (decentralized threat salience). These articles are shown below:

Centralized Threat Salience

New intelligence reports have conclusively established that America's chief terrorist threat continues to be Al Qaeda, which remains a centralized and highly-coordinated organization with an undiminished intent to attack the Homeland. At a briefing for reporters, senior officials from both the CIA and the Department of Homeland Security cautioned against underestimating the ability of Al Qaeda to recruit, train and plan for the long term. "Our most recent information tells us," the officials added, "that the terrorist command structure persists, making a 9/11 style attack on the U.S. very likely."

Decentralized Threat Salience

New intelligence reports conclude that the terrorist threat has significantly lessened. While many extremist organizations still operate around the world, they now constitute an unorganized collection of scattered, informal, and local groups rather than a single centralized organization with shared goals and coordinated operations. In recent years, a broad consensus has emerged among military and intelligence experts—both inside and outside of government—that these extremist groups are increasingly pursuing local agendas within their home countries, rather than shared operations targeting the West. "We have seen a striking shift in the focus and coordination of extremist groups around the world," one senior intelligence official added. "They are increasingly fragmented, small, and disorganized groups of disaffected people not chiefly driven by an anti-American ideology."

After respondents read either of the above “articles,” they were then asked how concerned there were that they or their family is at risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack. The results in the table below demonstrate that respondents in the decentralized salience group display less overall concern than do their counterparts in the centralized salience group. For example, note that those in the decentralized salience group are more likely to say they are “only slight concerned” (31%) or “not concerned at all” (9%) compared to respondents in the centralized salience group (25% and 7% respectively).

	Threat Salience		Total
	Centralized	Decentralized	
Extremely concerned	7	6	7
Very concerned	15	13	14
Fairly concerned	25	21	23
Somewhat concerned	22	20	21
<i>Only slightly concerned</i>	25	31	28
<i>Not concerned at all</i>	7	9	8

While responses among the two salience groups differ at a statistically significant level, one might still argue that the results are minimal at best. We would counter, however, that one should be surprised that the decentralized salience threat description had any effect at all. After all, the centralized salience description has been the dominant theme since 9/11, repeated countless times by government officials and most members of the media. By contrast, respondents reading the decentralized threat option were likely encountering this theme for the first time. Nevertheless, in that brief encounter the results show its impact can be significant in lowering overall terrorist concern. This is critical, because there is a direct relationship between feeling threatened by terrorists—or feeling insecure in general—and a willingness to support extralegal methods. Take, for example, the results below, in which those who are show little concern about terrorism are far more likely to disagree with the statement: I personally believe torture is wrong.

All respondents		Extremely concerned	Very concerned	Fairly concerned	Somewhat concerned	Only slightly concerned	Not concerned at all
		%	%	%	%	%	%
I personally believe torture is wrong.	Totally agree	34	29	30	45	54	67
	Agree somewhat	34	31	33	28	25	14
	Disagree somewhat	21	26	29	22	15	11
	Totally disagree	11	14	8	5	6	8

3. Respondents exposed to the decentralized salience prime are significantly less likely to support specific extralegal security measures described in the scenarios (e.g., racial profiling, detention, and warrantless wiretapping).

Regression analyses, which can control for key variables such as gender, party ID, race, etc., reveal statistically significant differences between the centralized salience and decentralized salience prime in each of the four scenarios. In the wiretapping example, one can begin to see evidence of these differences even in a simple crosstab. As the table below demonstrates, those in the decentralized salience group are significantly more likely to say they strongly oppose wiretapping (30%) than those saying the same in the centralized threat group (26%).

Support for wiretapping

	Centralized threat	Decentralized threat	All
	%	%	%
Strongly support	15	16	16
Somewhat support	30	25	27
Somewhat oppose	29	28	29
<i>Strongly oppose</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>28</i>

Further analysis regression reveals that, at least in the case of racial profiling, the alternative threat characterization had synergistic, not merely additive, effects when combined with efforts to argue that racial profiling is ineffective. The table immediately below reflects this finding. If the effects of each condition were merely additive, we would expect the bottom coefficient (reflecting the difference in response between those in the 'Morality/Potent' group and those in the 'Effectiveness/ Decentralized' group) to be -.10, the sum of $-.06 + -.04$. Instead the effect of being in the 'Effectiveness/ Decentralized' group is more than double what we would expect (at $-.20$).

Regression Coefficients for Support of Racial Profiling

	Comparison Group
Morality/Centralized	
Effectiveness/ Centralized	-0.06
Morality/Decentralized	-0.04
Effectiveness/ Decentralized	-0.20

Given these results, we believe that efforts to redefine the threat must be as high of a priority as efforts to better explicate effective ways of countering it.

4. When it comes to wiretapping and racial profiling, morality-based arguments (e.g., these methods violate the Constitution, are contrary to American values, etc.) appear to be counterproductive.

After respondents read each of the specific counterterrorism scenarios, they were then confronted with two opposing statements. One statement provided an argument in support of the extralegal method described in the scenario, and was seen by respondents in all four priming conditions. In the wiretapping scenario, for example, respondents read the following:

Some experts say that we have to act fast when we think we might be catching a terrorist, even if that means that sometimes we have to bypass slow legal procedures.

For respondents in the morality-based samples (within either the centralized threat prime or the decentralized threat prime), respondents read a countering statement as follows:

Some experts say that we must have legal oversight and accountability when the government records the conversations of U.S. citizens in order to protect our rights and the American principles we hold dear.

Respondents in the effectiveness-frame, by contrast, read the following:

Some experts say that randomly tapping phone lines without good evidence has not helped us catch any terrorists. It has only led to thousands of dead ends and the harassment of innocent Americans citizens.

In the case of wiretapping, arguments framed around effectiveness better able to convince Americans to oppose these methods than are arguments framed around morality. The table below shows that 59% of respondents in the effectiveness-based frame oppose wiretapping overall, compared to 53% in the morality-based frame.

Wiretapping	Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based	Total
	%	%	%
Strongly Support	18	14	16
Somewhat support	29	27	28
Somewhat Oppose	26	30	28
Strongly Oppose	27	29	28

Likewise, the results for racial profiling show that 57% of respondents in the effectiveness-based frame oppose the practice (33% strongly), compared to 53% of those in the morality-based frame (27%) strongly.

Racial Profiling	Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based	Total
	%	%	%
Strongly Support	22	18	20
Somewhat support	26	25	25
Somewhat Oppose	26	24	25
Strongly Oppose	27	33	30

The differences here may not be earth-shattering, but they are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. Considering that these arguments were delivered in one or two short sentences in a survey context, we would hope that they would be even more effective if they were delivered by, say, a rhetorically gifted and charismatic president, or if they could be disseminated through the media over the course of several months.

The fact that effectiveness-based arguments outmatch morality-based arguments (at least on wiretapping and profiling) may prove counter-intuitive to some audiences. Nevertheless, these results rest on a clear logic derived from well-established theories in political psychology and sociology.

- a. When many Americans hear moral and legal arguments against extra-legal tactics, they assume that the extra-legal measures are effective in preventing terrorism.
- b. Moral arguments against extra-legal security measures create a conflict between two competing moralities — “protecting American lives” vs. “upholding American values” — and thus the experience of cognitive dissonance. This creates serious and visible emotional discomfort among voters.
- c. Americans resolve their cognitive dissonance by more strongly supporting the extra-legal measures in the name of what they believe is the higher morality of protecting American lives. This “system justification” often takes the form of voters more forcefully insisting that that the authorities must know what they are doing.

Furthermore, these changes in overall support appear to have operated according to the cognitive dissonance mechanism we hypothesized. T-tests reveal that people reading effectiveness-framed arguments not only rate the effectiveness of wiretapping and racial

profiling lower than those reading morality framed argument, they also rated the morality of these methods lower than their counterparts. These results can also be demonstrated in crosstab form, as shown below. Here, we see that within the centralized threat samples, only 8% of those responding to effectiveness-based arguments rate wiretapping as effective (8 to 10 on a 10-point scale). By contrast, more than double (19%) of those responding to morality-based arguments say wiretapping is effective. As in the t-test description above, this effect also carries over into respondents' *morality* rating of wiretapping (8% vs. 15%). The same pattern is clearly evident within the decentralized threat samples as well, and also in the subsequent table on racial profiling.

All Respondents		Centralized Threat	
Wiretapping	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	19	8
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	15	8
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	17	8
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	13	8

All Respondents		Centralized Threat	
Racial profiling	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	18	12
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	19	11
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	18	10
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	15	10

Based on our understanding of the psychology at work, it appears that many respondents are saying to themselves, “These methods aren't effective. If they aren't effective, then they are not serving the moral purpose that counterterrorism experts say they are. So, they are not moral either. As such, I cannot support them very highly.” (Our analysts have performed more complex linear regression analyses of these findings and they come to the same conclusion as these simple cross-tabulations and t-tests.)

- 5. When it comes to detention and torture, it appears that moral and effectiveness arguments play an interactive role in undermining support for these methods.** On the one hand, effectiveness arguments consistently reduce Americans' estimations of the effectiveness and morality of detention and torture, while the morality-based arguments appear necessary to drive down overall support. This interactivity suggests that future research should investigate the effect of a combined morality/effectiveness-based argument.

This pattern is clearly evident in the detention table below. Looking first at respondents in the two centralized threat samples, we see that, as above, effectiveness-based arguments drive down assessments of both the effectiveness (19% vs. 9%) and morality (15% vs. 6%) of detention. Nevertheless, overall support for detention is markedly lower among respondents in the morality-based samples. Within the centralized threat samples, 37% of morality-based respondents support detention compared to 43% of effectiveness-based respondents. Within the decentralized threat samples, the results are similar at 37% vs. 42%.

All Respondents		Centralized Threat	
Detention	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	19	9
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	15	6
Strongly support method		15	15
Somewhat support method		22	28
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	17	9
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	10	7
Strongly support method		17	15
Somewhat support method		20	27

The results for torture echo those for detention, although effectiveness arguments appear to be less successful at decreasing the morality assessment. For example, within the centralized threat samples, 11% of effectiveness-based respondents say torture is effective, compared to 26% of respondents in the morality-based sample. But the two groups' morality assessment of torture is nearly the same at 8% and 11%. In the decentralized threat, the morality assessments are identical at 8% each.

The positive effect of morality-based arguments is especially apparent in people's evaluation of the harshness of the method, as well as in their overall support. In each case, the morality-based argument performs better than the effectiveness-argument. For example, within the centralized threat samples, 54% of morality-based respondents deem the torture method described as very harsh, compared to 46% of effectiveness-based respondents. Similarly, effectiveness-based respondents are more likely to support torture than are their morality-based counterparts (42% vs. 37%). A similar pattern can be seen in the decentralized threat samples, although in that case overall support for torture is actually *less* for the morality-based argument (40% to 41%). This discrepancy between support in the centralized and decentralized threat samples is addressed below.

All Respondents		Centralized Threat	
Torture	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	26	11
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	11	8
Very harsh treatment		54	46
Somewhat harsh treatment		37	43
Strongly support method		15	16
Somewhat support method		22	26
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	24	11
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	8	8
Very harsh treatment		51	46
Somewhat harsh treatment		40	44
Strongly support method		19	16
Somewhat support method		22	24

As noted above, the data reveal a discrepancy in support for torture in the two salience samples. Effectiveness-based respondents within the centralized threat sample appear to be more supportive of torture than their similar counterparts in the decentralized threat samples. Additional analyses showed that this discrepancy was partly the result of variation within each sample, and not solely due to the impact of the effectiveness frame. In short, despite our efforts to ensure that each of the four priming conditions was relatively equivalent, the four samples nevertheless differed on some attitudinal measures. Of primary importance here is respondents' level of support for moral principles (Q1e), the agree/disagree statement discussed in summary point one above. The table below shows the results for that Q1e broken down by response:

	Q1e. "Even as we battle threats to our security, our country must act in ways that are consistent with American values and American morality."			
	A/C: Centralized Threat/Immoral	A/D: Centralized Threat/Ineffective	B/C: Decentralized Threat/Immoral	B/D: Decentralized Threat/Ineffective
	%	%	%	%
Totally agree	56	48	54	58
Somewhat agree	37	41	40	35
Somewhat disagree	6	9	4	5
Totally disagree	1	1	1	1

Note that the “totally agree” result for the A/D sample—48%—is significantly lower than in the other conditions. This suggests to us that the A/D: Centralized Threat/Effectiveness-base sample is less morally anchored than are the other priming samples. This discrepancy appears in other questions as well. For example, only 36% of A/D respondents totally agree with the following statement: I personally believe torture is wrong. By contrast the results for the other conditions are: A/C (47%); B/C (46%); and B/D (42%).

This discrepancy becomes important when we compare results on torture among those who say totally agree in Q1e—i.e., the “morally anchored” respondents—to those in all the other response options combined. Among those in the totally agree column, 41% strongly oppose torture after weighing the various arguments. By contrast, only 30% in the “all other” column strongly oppose torture.

Torture	Q1e	Q1e	Total
	Totally agree	All others	
	%	%	%
Strongly Support	15	18	16
Somewhat support	21	26	23
Somewhat Oppose	22	26	24
Strongly Oppose	41	30	36

These findings result in two important conclusions. First, we believe that within the centralized threat samples, support for torture among effectiveness-based respondents is overstated, and that the current spread of 42% vs. 37% is likely closer to the minimal spread we see in the decentralized threat samples.

Second, these analyses point to a key finding that will be discussed below: morality-based arguments are likely to be far more effectual when used with morally-anchored constituencies.

6. The base and anti-base segments are highly driven both ideologically and psychologically, and their support or opposition to the various extralegal methods is far less dependent on arguments about morality or effectiveness. Nevertheless, morality-based arguments assist in firming up opposition among the base.

Regression analyses indicate that membership in either a base or anti-base segment is far more predictive of support or opposition to extralegal measures than effectiveness- or morality-based arguments, or other even demographics variables like gender, race, and party ID.

Nevertheless, the results for Engaged Egalitarians (base) indicate that morality-based arguments tend to solidify their opposition to these measures. The table below on torture is illustrative, especially when one looks at measures of immorality (0 to 10 on the earlier 10-point scale), harshness and opposition. For those response categories, morality-based arguments prove to be very persuasive in encouraging the base to believe the torture is more immoral, harsher, and warrants increased opposition compared to respondents reading effectiveness-based arguments.

Engaged Egalitarians (Base)		Centralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based
Torture	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	%	%
How ineffective is the method?	0 to 2	44	39
How immoral is the method?	0 to 2	71	65
Very harsh treatment		70	67
Somewhat harsh treatment		26	29
Strongly oppose method		61	50
Somewhat oppose method		21	30

Engaged Egalitarians (Base)		Decentralized Threat	
Torture	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How ineffective is the method?	8 to 10	44	45
How immoral is the method?	8 to 10	72	64
Very harsh treatment		77	63
Somewhat harsh treatment		19	34
Strongly oppose method		72	55
Somewhat oppose method		14	25

Not surprisingly, the story with the Detached Patriots (anti-base) is quite different. Initially, their responses mirror the total population, in that effectiveness -based arguments drive down assessments of both the effectiveness and morality of the methods. In the end, however, their support for extralegal methods is unwavering, and remains mostly constant across all four priming frames.

7. Town Square Faithfuls, who appear to be very “morally anchored” respond more strongly to moral arguments in cases where the extralegal method inflicts pain and suffering, but are otherwise partial to effectiveness-based arguments.

While this segment is extremely conservative, their conservatism is religiously-derived rather than ideologically-derived, making their assessment of extralegal methods significantly different from Detached Patriots (anti-base). In particular, Town Square Faithfuls appear to be extremely susceptible to arguments against extralegal methods, although the type of argument depends on the method in question. When the scenario involves a method that is less morally repugnant, and is less likely to inflict pain and suffering, effectiveness-based arguments seem to be more persuasive than are morality-based arguments. The two tables below on wiretapping and profiling illustrate this pattern. Note that in both threat salience conditions, overall support for the extralegal method is greater in the morality-based argument. This suggests that when presented with morality-based arguments and the method is less likely to trigger moral anguish, Town Square Faithfuls side with the morality of potentially saving (American) lives and elect to support the method.

Town Square Faithfuls		Centralized Threat	
Wiretapping	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	25	12
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	18	2
Strongly support method		15	16
Somewhat support method		38	25
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	32	10
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	16	8
Strongly support method		24	22
Somewhat support method		34	28

Town Square Faithfuls		Centralized Threat	
Profiling	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	21	12
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	22	13
Strongly support method		16	24
Somewhat support method		36	20
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	19	18
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	8	12
Strongly support method		18	19
Somewhat support method		29	16

The results change dramatically, however, once the scenarios evoke increased moral anxiety. In the detention example, despite the fact that effectiveness-based arguments drive down their assessments of detention's morality and effectiveness, Town Square

Faithfuls are less likely to support detention overall when responding to morality-based arguments (33% to 50% in the centralized threat frames; 48% vs. 46% in the decentralized threat frames).

Town Square Faithfuls		Centralized Threat	
Detention	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	19	12
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	14	9
Strongly support method		13	18
Somewhat support method		20	32
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	22	11
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	13	7
Strongly support method		20	20
Somewhat support method		26	28

For torture, the results are also pronounced. Even when effectiveness-based arguments undermine their assessments of tortures effectiveness and morality, it is the morality-based arguments that are most effectual at driving down overall support. Given the importance of this largest segment, this result echoes the earlier suggestion that addition research be conducted to hone a combined effectiveness/morality argument.

Town Square Faithfuls		Centralized Threat	
Torture	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	29	10
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	13	8
Very harsh treatment		58	44
Somewhat harsh treatment		34	52
Strongly support method		10	13
Somewhat support method		25	30
		Decentralized Threat	

		Morality-Based	Effectiveness-Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	23	11
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	6	9
Very harsh treatment		48	45
Somewhat harsh treatment		43	46
Strongly support method		17	13
Somewhat support method		26	33

8. Reluctant Fearfuls are especially susceptible to effectiveness arguments, particularly in an environment of increased threat salience.

The second largest swing segment, Reluctant Fearfuls' are nearly as concerned about terrorist attacks as the Unrestrained Fatalists. But unlike the Fatalists, their assessments of the extralegal methods and arguments in many ways mirror the population at large. Effectiveness-based arguments drive down their assessments of methods' effectiveness and morality, and drive down support for wiretapping and dentition. Where Reluctant Fearfuls diverge from both Fatalists and the population generally is that effectiveness-based arguments also appear to drive down support for detention and torture, making this segment rather unique. In addition, effectiveness-based arguments prove especially persuasive for Reluctant Fearfuls exposed to the centralized threat prime, suggesting that this frightened segment wants counterterrorism methods that work above all else.

In the wiretapping table below, for example, the strongly support difference between effectiveness-based (9%) and morality-based arguments (23%) in the centralized threat samples is far more than in the decentralized threat samples (15% v. 10%).

Reluctant Fearfuls		Centralized Threat	
Wiretapping	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	23	5
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	18	6
Strongly support method		23	9
Somewhat support method		35	50
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	15	3
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	11	10
Strongly support method		10	15
Somewhat support method		37	22

A similar pattern is revealed on profiling, with 12-percentage point spread in strong supporting within the centralized threat samples compared to a 5-percentage point spread within the decentralized threat samples.

Reluctant Fearfuls		Centralized Threat	
Profiling	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	23	10
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	25	7
Strongly support method		26	14
Somewhat support method		29	41
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	17	7
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	7	11
Strongly support method		23	18
Somewhat support method		29	38

Detention follows the same pattern, with effectiveness trumping morality in decreasing support, with the results far more pronounced within the centralized threat samples.

Reluctant Fearfuls		Centralized Threat	
Detention	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	24	6
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	15	4
Strongly support method		12	4
Somewhat support method		33	33
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	18	7
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	7	6
Strongly support method		10	11
Somewhat support method		35	37

For torture, the results are a bit more mixed. On the one hand, we continue to see this segment's susceptibility to effectiveness-based arguments, with a greater degree of strong support for torture being exhibited by the respondents reading morality-based arguments. But the effect of threat salience decreases somewhat, with only a one-percentage point spread between strong support in the centralized threat samples and the decentralized threat samples.

Reluctant Fearfuls		Centralized Threat	
Torture	10-point scale (10 = completely effective/moral)	Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	29	16
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	13	7
Very harsh treatment		53	47
Somewhat harsh treatment		39	45
Strongly support method		18	12
Somewhat support method		25	40
		Decentralized Threat	
		Morality-Based	Effectiveness- Based
		%	%
How effective is the method?	8 to 10	31	9
How moral is the method?	8 to 10	8	6
Very harsh treatment		47	40
Somewhat harsh treatment		49	47
Strongly support method		17	12
Somewhat support method		33	37

Appendix A.

Memo

To: Nancy Chang, Meg Gage, and Steven Hawkins

From: Ted Nordhaus and John Whaley, American Environics

Date: July 2008

Re: Initial Segmentation Report

Our objective was to develop a segmentation solution using results from 2007 American Values Survey (AVS) in order to understand the key psychological drivers on national security and human rights issues. As a reminder, the first step in our investigation entailed factor analyses on relevant AVS questions related to the issues under review. Five factors emerged from this process:

AVS Factors:

Peace & Security Factor One (6 questions):

Agree that the U.S. is justified in using nuclear weapons to...

1. ...respond to a nuclear attack on an ally of the U.S
2. ...prevent a country from launching a nuclear attack on the U.S. by attacking that country first
3. ...attack a hardened terrorist hiding place immune to conventional attack
4. ...respond to a non-nuclear attack on the U.S.
5. ...respond to a nuclear attack on the U.S. by another country
6. Agree with Statement A:
 - A) It is unrealistic to eliminate nuclear weapons and we should continue to improve their capability OR
 - B) The U.S. would set a bad example by abandoning restraint and developing new types of nuclear weapons

Peace & Security Factor Two (6 questions):

1. It WAS worth going to war in Iraq
2. NOT Terrorism can be contained through law enforcement, intelligence and diplomacy, rather than military solutions
3. When it comes to national defense and military purposes, we are spending too little
4. The U.S. should try to solve problems like terrorism and the environment on our own (NOT through international institutions)
5. The U.S. SHOULD initiate military action against Iran
6. The U.S. should NOT negotiate with our enemies

Peace & Security Factor Three (2 questions):

1. Very concerned that you and your family are at risk from a major terrorist attack
2. Very concerned that the U.S. is at risk from a major terrorist attack

National Security & Human Rights Factor One (4 questions):

1. I worry about the government reading my mail or listening to my phone calls.
2. Agree with Statement B: When it comes to dealing with terrorist threats, what do you think is more important right now?
 - A) For the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy; or
 - B) For the federal government not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats.
3. Belief that American have less freedom today
4. Favorable feelings about the American Civil Liberties Union

National Security & Human Rights Factor Two (2 questions):

1. The freedom to be able to express unpopular ideas without fearing for my safety is extremely important
2. The freedom to have a government that doesn't spy on me or interfere with my life is extremely important


Segmentation Process

We then determined 17 distinct AVS Social Values that are most likely to drive differentiation between factor tails on all five factors.¹ These values subsequently became the key indicators in running Latent Class Clustering, in which the software detects subtle—i.e., latent—patterns within the data to produce segments that possess a coherent set of values internally, yet remain externally discrete compared to other segments. This process produced eight distinct segments, or “publics,” with each one possessing a unique set of social values, with each set shaping attitudes on issues related to national security and human rights.

¹ Three statistical techniques were used to hone the list of key values: discriminant factor analysis, correlation, and linear regression.

The values map below highlights the differentiated nature of these segments—which we label “COO” for “Constituents of Opportunity.” Each COO occupies a distinct space on the map, with each of the four map quadrants containing two COOs. The COOs are labeled in order of their size, with COO1 representing 27% of the public and COO8 representing 5%. The table below shows the relative size of each COO.

COO1	COO2	COO3	COO4	COO5	COO6	COO7	COO8
27%	16%	15%	13%	9%	9%	6%	5%



BASE SEGMENTS—COO2 & COO6

The dashed line denotes the approximate political axis in the U.S., with liberal Democrats occupying the lower right area of the map, and conservative Republicans occupying the upper left area of the map. Following this axis, we see that the solution produces two segments (COO2 & COO6) that possess more progressive attitudes on national security and human rights issues. For example, approximately 90% of each segment say it was NOT worth going to war in Iraq, and are far more likely than Americans generally to support protecting privacy rights over invasive terrorism investigations. And while COO2 and COO6 vary at a values level (in part because COO2 has a significantly higher proportion of younger men), for strategic purposes we can consider both of them to be “Base” segments.

ANTI-BASE SEGMENT—COO8

By contrast, COO8 represents a stark “Anti-base”, with 88% of respondents in that segment believing the Iraq war WAS worth it. Likewise, 95% want the federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal privacy.

SWING SEGMENT—COO1

An initial analysis of the five remaining “swing” segments indicates that each presents a combination of opportunities and challenges for recasting the national security and human rights landscape in a progressive light. For its part, respondents residing in COO1 embody a set of conservative values, attitudes and demographics that are in some ways similar to the anti-base. However, these characteristics are conservative in a more traditional/religious sense, unlike the more militaristic and politically ideological attributes of COO1’s anti-base counterpart. Also, COO1 demonstrates a greater commitment to society and social connections, whereas COO8 is much more individualistic. For example, COO1 is high on Liberal Communitarianism—the belief that it is important to think about one’s own life in the context of others rather than focusing only on what benefits oneself—while COO8 is very low on this value. Other community-versus-individualistic differences can be seen in the comparison of each segment’s top ten values below:

COO1	COO8
• Religiosity	• American Entitlement
• Traditional Family	• Cultural Assimilation
• Humans Superior to Animals	• Opposition to Group-Based Equality
• Spiritual Quest	• Excessive taxation
• Propriety	• Traditional Family
• Patriarchy	• Humans Superior to Animals
• Importance of Discipline	• Ecological Fatalism
• Moral Collapse	• Modern Racism
• Traditional Community	• Individual Before Community
• Duty	• Xenophobia

COO1 also differs with COO8 on some national security and human rights issues, despite being the second most Republican leaning segment. On Iraq, for example, COO1 is split on whether going to war was worth it. They are also far less likely to see nuclear weapons as justified (PS Factor 1) or to support a militaristic/unilateral view foreign policy stance. However, COO1 shares COO8’s belief that thwarting terrorism trumps privacy rights, with 86% allowing for more invasive investigations.

SWING SEGMENT—COO3

COO3 is a somewhat undifferentiated segment in that many of its values, attitudes and demographics do not vary significantly from those of Americans generally. That alone makes it an attractive swing segment. What makes this segment even more attractive strategically is the fact that most of the few values it *does* hold strongly (shown below) relate directly to insecurity and fear. These insecurities are also reflected in a higher than average belief of being personal victims of a terrorist attack.

• Aversion to Complexity
• Fear of Violence
• Importance of Brand
• Technology Anxiety
• Moral Collapse

The flip side of having so few strongly held values is that COO3 tends to be *low* on many social values, reflecting the segments largely non-ideological/dispassionate view of the world. Likewise, COO3 members are far less committed to positions on either side of national security and human rights issues, with many of their views in seeming conflict. For example, they tilt somewhat toward the base segments on nuclear weapons (PS Factor One) and militarism (PS Factor Two), but lean conservative on the two NSHR Factors.

SWING SEGMENT—COO4

COO4 embodies a largely inhospitable view of the world, especially as it applies to social engagement and conceptions of “the other.” Looking at its top ten values (shown below), we see many of the same anti-other and hierarchical mindsets as those expressed by the anti-base (COO8). COO4 also exhibits a harder edge than does COO8, with the former possessing far more fatalistic, disengaged and dog-eat-dog views.

• Cultural Assimilation
• Group-based Social Dominance
• Xenophobia
• Parochialism
• Sexual Permissiveness
• American Entitlement
• Every Man for Himself
• Meaningless Life and Future
• Social Isolation
• Acceptance of Violence

COO4 also shares some of COO8's attitudes on national security and human rights issues, with few in either segment, for example, embracing a multilateral foreign policy approach. However, COO4 is far less ideological and political than COO8, which in part explains its map placement far from the dashed partisan axis. For example, only 11% of COO4 members identify as strong Republicans compared to 62% for COO8. Likewise, nearly three quarters of COO4 respondents describe themselves as ideologically moderate, whereas a similar proportion of COO8 respondents say they are conservative.

SWING SEGMENT—COO5

With its location in the same Exclusion and Intensity map quadrant as COO4, COO5 shares a similar set of combative and fatalistic values (see below) as the former segment. But while COO4 is nearly all white (84%), COO5 is the *least* white of any segment (38%). It is also the youngest segment, with 20% of its members younger than 25.

• Unfettered Individualism
• Confidence in Big Business
• Ecological Fatalism
• Ostentatious Consumption
• Group-based Social Dominance
• Acceptance of Violence
• Civic Apathy
• Sexism
• Modern Racism
• Pursuit of Intensity

As with COO4, COO5 lacks ideological or political commitment, which makes it difficult to get a clean read on their issue attitudes. For example, few occupy the top tail on militarism and unilateralism (PS1), yet few occupy the bottom tail either. This pattern reflects this segment's generally unwillingness on many questions to answer emphatically one way or another.

SWING SEGMENT—COO7

As COO7's top ten values indicate below, this segment shares COO4 and COO5's propensity for fatalism but adds COO8's emphasis on security. As with COO5, only 39% of this segment is white, but whereas COO5 was dominated by young men, COO7 is older and majority female. The segment is also considerably poorer than other segments: 61% have household incomes of \$30,000 or less.

• Group-based Social Dominance
• Tried and True
• Fatalism
• Confidence in Big Business
• Ecological Fatalism
• National Pride
• Unfettered Individualism
• Xenophobia
• Unmet Basic Needs
• Intuition & Impulse

Most striking is this segment's firm belief that another terrorist attack is imminent. Seven in ten say they are very concerned about the country being attacked, nearly twice the national average. On a personal level, 54% of COO7 express the same concern that terrorists will attack them or their families, compared to only 19% nationally. These fears lead COO7 to firmly embrace an invasive approach to investigating terrorists, a position they share with the anti-base despite the latter being far less likely to worry about an impending terrorist attack. The two segments also share a belief that the use of nuclear weapons is largely justified (likely reflecting a "whatever it takes to keep me safe" mentality).

Ironically, its fatalistic character makes COO7 elevate the importance of being able to express unpopular views and not be spied upon, aligning it with the two base segments. This segment also tends to be aligned with the base on a partisan level, as the segment's high level of poorer, non-white women makes it far more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans.